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Taking Oaths Seriously: A Comment on
Carter and Sunstein
Sanford Levinson
Lief Carter and Cass Sunstein once again have proved themselves inca-
pable of writing anything uninteresting. Both offer thoughtful observa-
tions about the social practice of oaths, and both indicate as well a mea-
sure of justifiable skepticism about the practice. The skepticism is derived
from a mixture of normative opposition to the induced conformity often
associated with oaths and doubts about the empirical likelihood of oaths
actually contributing to the behavior sought. Carter, typically, includes in
his arguments apt reference to his personal experience; Sunstein, just as
typically, presents the reader with a masterful tour d'horizon of the vari-
ous circumstances in which societies look to oaths to accomplish some so-
cial good. Still, having acknowledged the clear strengths of their essays, I
confess that I find something missing in each of the pieces. In spite of
Carter's personalism, I find both ultimately too detached and almost dis-
missive of the powerful role that oaths play in the lives of almost each and
every one of us.
At one level what I would like, and sought to encourage in my book
Constitutional Faith, which contains an extensive discussion of loyalty
oaths,1 is more personal reflection about the oaths we have in fact taken
with pleasure and pride, those we have taken with feelings of discomfort
and a loss of self-respect, and, finally, those, if any, we have refused to
take. More precisely, I am interested in the phenomenological experience
of taking such common oaths as those indicating one's assent, among other
things, to uphold the Constitution of the United States; uphold the Consti-
tution of Texas (or Connecticut); become wedded to someone "until death
do us part"; or acknowledge the sovereignty of God or the trinitarian na-
ture of the Godhead. It is almost certainly easiest for most of us to impute
a special emotional significance to such "private" experiences as exchang-
ing wedding vows.2 But with some frequency one can find evidence of a
strong (positive) emotional valence attached to more "public" oaths as
well. Thus Gaetano Salvemini, a refugee from Mussolini's Italy, wrote
1. S. Levinson, Constitutional Faith 90-121 (1988).
2. The purpose of the "scare quotes" is to suggest some dubiousness about the separation of
"public" and "private." Marriage is an especially obvious example of how public decisions and dis-
course actually control what one may wish to view as the private realm of one's life.
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Felix Frankfurter, who is unique among Justices of the Supreme Court
for having been a naturalized citizen, about the meaning of the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution required of new citizens. "I took the oath
with a joyous heart," wrote Salvemini, "and I am sure I will keep it with
the whole of my heart as long as I am alive. '
To be sure, there are many less happy reminiscences about compulsory
oaths, and there is indeed good reason to be wary of them. Yet, whatever
the qualms that many of us might have with one or another of these oaths,
can we truly imagine our own lives devoid of oaths? Do we plausibly
regard their continuing presence even in our own lives as merely a sur-
vival of more "primitive" (or simply repressive) ways of thinking about
the world and of our place in it? Might they instead continue to perform
powerful, and necessary, functions even for sophisticated "moderns"? As I
noted in Constitutional Faith, a remarkable number of even "advanced"
intellectuals continue to mark the status of the relationship with their
most significant other by going through wedding ceremonies and the ex-
change of oaths. (I am less certain, though, that such intellectuals make
oaths a constitutive aspect of the organizations that they form.) Assuming
the truth of these observations, what can we learn from them?
One way of addressing the social meaning of oaths is to ask if we-i.e.,
writers for and readers of journals like this one-would really wish to
eliminate some of the specific oaths that now arise in our lives. Sunstein
spends a great deal of time on an oath (or, more accurately, a "pledge of
allegiance") that I assume most of us would in fact eliminate or, at the
very least, make the refusal to recite it costless. But there is something
misleading about emphasizing the pledge to the flag, which Sunstein accu-
rately notes is a relative newcomer to the array of standard American
cultural ceremonies. There are others both older and much deeper in cul-
tural resonance than the pledge. Thus, in offering some comments about
Carter's and Sunstein's presentations at the conference at which they were
initially given, I noted the oath, going back some 350 years to the 1640s,
that Connecticut to this day requires of those who would vote in its
elections:4
You solemnly swear that you will be true and faithful to the state of
Connecticut, and to the constitution and the government thereof, as a
free and independent state, and to the constitution of the United
States; . . .and, that whenever you are called upon to give your vote
or choice touching any matter which concerns this state or the
United States, you will do this in a manner which you shall judge
3. Quoted in S. Levinson, Constitutional Faith, supra note 1, at 3.
4. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-25 (1987). 1 discuss the oath in Suffrage and Community: Who
Should Vote?, 41 U. Fla. L. Rev. 545, 560-61 (1989).
[Vol. 2: 113
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contributes to the best interests of Connecticut and the nation, with-
out respect or favor of any person ...
I am interested in how we-and again, I must insist that the "we" here
is you and I, the actual communicants in this article, as opposed to a
much vaguer and amorphous "society" to which "we" as individuals may
feel no strong sense of attachment-assess an oath that applies to almost
every member of the Yale Law School student body and faculty, or at
least those who conceive of themselves as Connecticut citizens and desire
to participate in the state or national electoral process.
This oath is clearly linked to the republican vision of taming the
egocentricity of citizens by binding them to the more embracing commu-
nity and its general interests; genuine citizens do not cast their ballots
merely to maximize their selfish interests. I was particularly interested in
Sunstein's reaction, given the role he has played, along with Frank
Michelman of Harvard, as an especially vigorous proponent of the so-
called "neorepublican revival" in the contemporary legal academy.' Does
Sunstein believe that Connecticut is committing a mistake by retaining
this aspect of its own republican heritage? That is, would Sunstein (or
any reader of these remarks) support its repeal in 1989 because of a gen-
eral skepticism about, or perhaps outright antipathy to, the notion of a
state-imposed oath on such a fundamental aspect of citizenship as voting?
Or, even if one does not counsel Connecticut to repeal the oath, would one
(and especially Sunstein) be opposed to the adoption by Illinois of such an
oath as part of an effort to re-establish a more republican social order in
the heartland of interest-group liberalism?' Adopting the tone of a final
exam giver, I asked Sunstein in particular these questions followed by "if
so, why; if not, why not?" Because I think that the answers to such ques-
tions will take us surprisingly deeply into some of the most complex and
important features of political thought, I am disappointed at the failure of
both Carter and Sunstein to address this example.
Other oaths raise similar questions. Consider, for example, the presi-
dential oath set out in Article II of the Constitution. Does Carter's justi-
fied skepticism about the efficacy of oaths lead him to support omitting
that oath? Or, for those who are in fact perturbed by the possibility of no
oath at all, what about a revision to require that the President "behave as
I believe to be in the best interests of the United States of America" rather
than the present promise to pay particular heed to the Constitution of the
United States? Finally, how many of us would truly be comfortable revis-
ing our naturalization practices so as to eliminate the oath to which Pro-
5. See, e.g., their respective articles in Symposium: The Republican Civil Tradition, 97 Yale L.J.
1493 (1988).
6. See Levinson, Suffrage and Community, supra note 4, for an extensive discussion of various
conceptions of the meaning of (and prerequisites to) participation as a community decisionmaker.
1990)
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fessor Salvemini made such glowing reference? Should we be truly indif-
ferent to the political commitments of those who would join our polity? I,
for one, have a hard time expressing such indifference, even as I continue
to defend maximal tolerance for diversity of (even pernicious) views ar-
ticulated by those who are already citizens.
Without overemphasizing the point, I think it is worth noting that the
very first act to pass the new United States Congress in 1789 dealt with
the oaths to be taken by public officials.7 To be sure, the importance
ascribed by our eighteenth-century forbears to oaths may simply exem-
plify yet one more way in which they inhabited a radically different con-
ceptual world from our own. If so, though, the implications of our con-
temporary inability to take oaths seriously may call into question, rather
more ominously, the ability to take seriously the overarching enterprise of
maintaining a constitutional republic.
In the course of presenting arguments about oaths in a variety of ve-
nues, I have discovered that persons of all ideological stripes are in fact
remarkably hesitant either to support the omission of oaths entirely or,
just as tellingly, to support their change in the directions suggested. Even
many die-hard legal realists seem surprisingly resistant to the notion that
oaths are just so much mumbo-jumbo that should be sloughed off in our
more sophisticated, post-modernist society. Is this hesitancy simply a fail-
ure of imagination, or does it tell us something significant about the limits
of post-modernity and the linkages that remain to earlier worlds and their
presuppositions?
Carter's rather charming social-psychological explanation for the
Ulysses-at-the-mast aspect of wedding ceremonies applies, of course, far
more to the overall ceremonial festivities than to the oath as such. That is,
it is almost certainly the inviting of the guests and the booking of the
caterer that serve to pull newly dubious couples through the ordeal of
actually committing themselves to one another, rather than the specifics of
the wedding vow. It is the particular role of the vow (and its particular
content) that I find most intriguing, and I am not sure that Carter ulti-
mately speaks to these points.
In any event, even while applauding the remarks of Carter and Sun-
stein, I believe that much more remains to be said. More importantly, the
persons who must do the saying are ultimately we ourselves, in our role as
ordinary citizens, spouses, and social beings. We should, I strongly be-
lieve, develop a stronger willingness to speak in our own voices, presenting
the meanings we ascribe to the events of our own lives, rather than retreat
so quickly to the voice of the detached academic who might, for all one
knows, be analyzing some society ten thousand miles away. It is not that
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the latter has no place. But to privilege this more detached voice, even
putting aside obvious questions about the possibility of becoming truly
"detached" from one's own perspective, is to ignore the pressing need to
understand better how we are constituted as defined selves in communion
with others.
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